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Diaz v. Ferne, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 12, 84 P.3d 664 (Nev. 2004)1 
 
COVENANTS AND CC & R’s—INTERPRETATION AND 





 Appeal from a permanent injunction issued by the Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Nevada barring a family from installing a manufactured home on their lot in a 
subdivision in Pahrump, Nevada. 
    
Disposition 
 
 Reversed. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the CC & R’s governing the 
subdivision did not expressly prohibit manufactured homes on the lots, only mobile 
homes. The court pointed to language in the Nevada statutes that made distinctions 
between the two. 
  
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In December 2000, the Diaz family purchased property designated as a “Single-
Family Lot”2 in the Calvada Valley subdivision located in Pahrump, Nevada. The CC & 
R’s restricted the placement, alteration or erection of buildings without the approval of 
the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC). 
Shortly after purchasing their lot the Diaz family submitted plans to the Pahrump 
Regional Planning District, requesting permission to build a manufactured home on their 
lot. Subsequently, the Diaz family received a letter from the Calvada Homeowners 
Protection Corporation (CHPC) denying their request and stating that they were building 
“without the approval or disapproval of the ARC.” 
 In a reply letter to the CHPC the Diaz family explained their plans to build a 
“triple-wide modular home with an attached two-car garage,” and again requested 
approval. The ARC again denied the request but the Diaz family proceeded without 
approval and had the manufactured home placed on their property. Subsequently, an 
owner of an adjacent property in the subdivision brought suit to enjoin further 
construction of the home. 
  
                                                 
1 By Christopher W. Carson 
2 The CC & R’s for the Calvada subdivision, filed in June 1987, provided in pertinent part:  
Lots in the subdivision shall be classified by permitted uses, building 
requirements and limitations, set-backs and parking requirements for each 
permitted use classification are as follows…A. Single-Family Lots, 1. Lots of 
this classification shall be used only for single-family homes, including 
accessory buildings… F. Mobile Home Lots, 1. Lots of this classification shall 
be used only for single-family dwellings or mobile homes… 
After trial, Fifth District Judge John P. Davis found that the Calvada CC & R’s prohibited 
the Diaz family from building on the lot because their lot was classified as a “Single-
Family Lot” which excluded the building of mobile homes on these lots. The district 
court concluded that “the term mobile home as used in the CC & R’s unambiguously 
includes a manufactured home” and therefore the Diaz family was permanently enjoined 
from constructing a manufactured home on their lot. The Diaz family appealed. 
   
Discussion 
 
 The Diaz’s contended that the district court erroneously included the definition of 
“manufactured home” within the definition of “mobile home.” To determine if this was 
the case, the Nevada Supreme Court first interpreted the Calvada CC & R’s by applying 
the rules of construction governing the interpretation of contracts to the interpretation of 
restrictive covenants on real property.3 The court also held since there was no dispute of 
fact in this instance the CC & R’s interpretation is a legal question subject to de novo 
review.4 
 The court held that the problem in this instance lies in the fact that the Calvada 
CC & R’s do not mention the term “manufactured home” rather only “mobile home.” 
The court concluded there is a difference in both popular meaning and in the Nevada 
statutes,5 between a “manufactured home” and “mobile home.” Therefore, the CHPC and 
APC could not prevent the building of “manufactured homes” on “Single-Family Lots” 
within the Calvada subdivision and the Nevada Supreme Court lifted the injunction. 
 The court strengthened their holding by pointing to the fact that the statutory 
language was in effect in 1987 when the CC & R’s were filed. Therefore, the Court 
presumed that the drafters were aware or should have been aware of the distinction 
between manufactured and mobile homes. If the drafters wished to exclude manufactured 
homes from “Single-Family Lots” they would have explicitly done so. 
 The court also pointed to public policy issues that were addressed by the Nevada 
Legislature when they passed NRS 278.020956, which requires any zoning ordinance 
relating to a “single-family residence” allow the use of manufactured homes on that site 
                                                 
3 Tompkins v. Buttrum Constr. Co., 99 Nev. 142, 144 (1983). 
4 Lorenz v. Beltio, Ltd., 114 Nev. 795, 803 (1988). 
5 Nevada statutes clearly draw a distinction between a manufactured home and a mobile home. NRS 
489.113 states:  
1. “Manufactured home” means a structure which is: (a) Built on a permanent 
chassis; (b) Designed to be used with or without a permanent foundation as a 
dwelling when connected to utilities; (c) Transportable in one or more 
sections…(2) Built in compliance with the requirements of chapter 461 of the 
NRS. In contrast, NRS 489.120 defines a “mobile home” as: 1. “Mobile home” 
means a structure which is: (a) Built on a permanent chassis; (b) Designed to be 
used with or without a permanent foundation as a dwelling when connected to 
utilities; and (c) Transportable in one or more sections…3. The term does not 
include a recreational park trailer, travel trailer, commercial coach or 
manufactured home or any structure built in compliance with the requirements 
of chapter 461 of the NRS. Chapter 461 of the NRS is title “Manufactured 
Buildings” and includes an exception that does not include mobile home or 
recreational park trailer under the definition of a “Manufactured building.” 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. 278.02095 (2004). 
unless a recorded restrictive covenant prohibits their use. This law was passed to make 
housing and home ownership of  “single-family residences” more feasible for the largest 




 Because the Calvada CC & R’s did not expressly prohibit the use of 
“manufactured homes” only “mobile homes,” both public policy and a strict 
interpretation of the covenant language7 leads to the conclusion that the district court 
injunction was issued in error. 
                                                 
7 Dickstein v. Williams, 93 Nev. 605, 608 (1977). 
